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Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.: A Dramatic Change 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 22, 2008, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, 
handed down the most important decision in design patent law in 
nearly twenty-five years.1  Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. 
  
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center (2010); B.S.E., Electrical Engi-
neering, University of Michigan, magna cum laude (2006).  This note was the 
winning entry in the third annual Pierce Law Student Symposium writing competi-
tion.  The author would like to thank Pierce Law Review members Elizabeth La-
hey, Wallace Young, and Paul Smith for their feedback. 
 1. See Perry J. Saidman, Egyptian Goddess Exposed!, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 859, 885 (2008) [hereinafter Exposed!] (“Egyptian Goddess represents 
a sea change in the law . . . .”); Rebecca L. Hanovice, ‘Egyptian Goddess’ Revises 
Design Patent Analysis: Federal Circuit Disposed of the Long-Standing ‘Point of 
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(Egyptian Goddess III)2 abolished the point-of-novelty test first set 
out in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Talge3 and adopted by the Federal 
Circuit in Litton Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.4  The point-of-
novelty test required patent holders to prove that an accused design 
appropriated the element which sets the patented design apart from 
the prior art—in addition to the ordinary-observer standard’s re-
quirement of having substantially the same appearance—in order to 
prove infringement.5 
The point-of-novelty test proved difficult to apply and often ren-
dered valid design patents unenforceable.6  Additionally, the test had 
no basis in Supreme Court precedent.7  In place of the rigid point-of-
novelty test, the Federal Circuit announced a more malleable ordi-
nary-observer standard that gives factfinders more leeway in evaluat-
ing infringement.8  Egyptian Goddess has been hailed as a major 
victory for owners of design patents, but this Note argues that the 
actual effect will be much more muted. 
After giving an overview of design patents, this Note will ana-
lyze the cases that preceded the Federal Circuit’s adoption of the 
point-of-novelty test in Litton Systems.  Additionally, this Note will 
discuss some of the cases decided during the reign of the point-of-
novelty test to demonstrate the problems inherent in it.  After cover-
ing Egyptian Goddess in depth, the Note will then argue that Egyp-
tian Goddess’s effect will be limited. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
  
Novelty’ Test, NAT’L L.J. (N.Y., N.Y.), Dec. 1, 2008, at S3 (“This is a wake-up 
call . . . .”). 
 2. 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 3. 140 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1944). 
 4. 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 5. See id. at 1444. 
 6. See infra notes 109–13 and accompanying text. 
 7. See Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d at 672. 
 8. See id. at 678. 
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tive Writings and Discoveries.”9  Congress first explicitly provided 
patent protection for designs in 1842.10  Currently, design patents are 
available for “any new, original and ornamental design for an article 
of manufacture.”11  In general, design patents are governed by the 
same statutory provisions as utility patents.12  Notably, design pat-
ents have terms of fourteen years from the date of granting,13 and, in 
an infringement action, patentees have available an additional rem-
edy vis-a-vis utility patents.14 
Design patents cover only the ornamental features of a design.  
Generally, these ornamental features consist of one or both of (1) “a 
design for an ornament, impression, print, or picture applied to or 
embodied in an article of manufacture” or (2) “a design for the shape 
or configuration of an article of manufacture.”15  Unlike utility pat-
ents, design patents are generally not accompanied by verbal 
claims.16  Rather, each design patent can only contain a single claim, 
represented by drawings.17 
  
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 10. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, 5 Stat. 543 (“[A]ny citizen or citizens . . . 
who by his, her, or their own industry, genius, efforts, and expense, may have 
invented or produced any new and original design for a manufacture . . . may 
make application in writing to the Commissioner of Patents . . . and the Commis-
sioner . . . may grant a patent therefor . . . .”).  Under this act, design patents were 
given terms of seven years.  Id. § 3, 5 Stat. at 544. 
 11. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. § 173.  In general, a utility patent’s term is twenty years from the date of 
application.  Id. § 154. 
 14. See id. § 289.  Specifically, the owner of a design patent is entitled to an 
infringer’s total profits, not less than $250.  Id.  This is in addition to damages 
sufficient “to return the patent owner to the financial position he would have occu-
pied but for the infringement” that is available to all patentees.  Carborundum Co. 
v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing 
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); see 35 U.S.C. 
§ 289.  Section 289 prohibits a patentee from “twice recover[ing] the profit made 
from the infringement.”  35 U.S.C. § 289. 
 15. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1504.01 (8th ed., rev. 7 2008). 
 16. Id. § 1503.01. 
 17. Id. 
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Design patents may overlap with other types of intellectual prop-
erty.  In In re Yardley,18 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
allowed for the design of a watch to be both copyrighted and pro-
tected by design patent, stating: 
Congress, through its legislation under the authority of the 
Constitution, has interpreted the Constitution as authorizing 
an area of overlap where a certain type of creation may be the 
subject matter of a copyright and the subject matter of a de-
sign patent. We see nothing in that legislation which is con-
tradictory and repugnant to the intent of the framers of the 
Constitution.19 
Similarly, the same design may be protected under both trade-
mark and design patent.  The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
held in In re Mogen David Wine Corp.20 that trademark rights “exist 
independently of [design patent rights], under different law and for 
different reasons.”21  Therefore, the applicant was allowed to receive 
protection under both statutes.22 
III. ORIGIN OF THE ORDINARY OBSERVER 
The first U.S. Supreme Court case to attempt to set a standard for 
design-patent infringement was Gorham Co. v. White.23  The plain-
tiff in Gorham held a patent on a design for the handles of table-
spoons and forks.24  The patented design was very popular, and the 
value of the patent was “immense.”25  White, the defendant, obtained 
  
 18. 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
 19. Id. at 1395–96. 
 20. 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
 21. Id. at 930. 
 22. Id. at 932.  This dual-coverage was a basis in the U.S. Supreme Court’s re-
cent requirement of secondary meaning for trademark protection of product con-
figurations.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000) 
(“[T]he producer can ordinarily obtain protection for a design that is inherently 
source identifying (if any such exists), but that does not yet have secondary mean-
ing, by securing a design patent or a copyright for the design . . . .”). 
 23. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1872). 
 24. Id. at 512; see U.S. Patent No. D1,440 (filed July 16, 1861). 
 25. Gorham, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 512 & n.3. 
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two patents for similar designs.26  Gorham sued in equity to enjoin 
White from the manufacture or sale of spoons or forks covered by 
White’s patents.27  White defended on the grounds that his designs 
did not infringe Gorham’s.28  The two designs, although similar, 
were not identical.29  Experts for both sides testified as to the simi-
larity vel non of the two designs.30 
 
 




The Court held that a design patent protects “that which gives a 
peculiar or distinctive appearance to the manufacture, or article to 
which it may be applied, or to which it gives form.”32  In determin-
  
 26. Id. at 512; see U.S. Patent No. D2,992 (filed Mar. 31, 1868); U.S. Patent No. 
D2,551 (filed Jan. 15, 1867). 
 27. Gorham, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 512. 
 28. Id. at 512–13. 
 29. See id. at 520. 
 30. Id. at 513–18. 
 31. Id. at 521. 
 32. Id. at 525. 
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ing whether a design patent is infringed, “the controlling considera-
tion is the resultant effect” of the design.33  Therefore, the test for 
infringement turns on the “sameness of appearance,” and slight vari-
ations in the designs will not avoid infringement.34  Turning to 
White’s contention that, for infringement to be found, an accused 
design must be indistinguishable from the patented design to an ex-
pert, the Court recognized that such a test would be extremely nar-
row.35  The Court added: 
It is [observers of ordinary acuteness] who are the principal 
purchasers of the articles to which designs have given novel 
appearances, and if they are misled, and induced to purchase 
what is not the article they supposed it to be . . . the patentees 
are injured, and that advantage of a market which the patent 
was granted to secure is destroyed.36 
Following this reasoning, the Court established the test for in-
fringement of a design patent: 
[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention 
as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the 
same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an ob-
server, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the 
other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.37 
In Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co.,38 the Supreme Court further 
elaborated on the test for infringement.  The Whitman Saddle Com-
pany held a design patent for a saddle that was a combination of two 
older saddles: the cantle, or back, was the same as that of a Jenifer 
saddle, while the pommel, or front, was the same as that of Granger 
saddle, except that the pommel of the patented design fell off per-
pendicularly on its rear side.39  Whitman Saddle Company sued 
Smith and Bourn for infringement of the patent.40  The Smith saddle 
  
 33. Gorham, 81 U.S. (14 (Wall.) at 526. 
 34. Id. at 526–27. 
 35. Id. at 527. 
 36. Id. at 528. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 148 U.S. 674 (1893). 
 39. Id. at 676; see U.S. Patent No. D10,844 (filed Sept. 2, 1878). 
 40. Whitman Saddle, 148 U.S. at 675. 
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incorporated the Jenifer cantle and Granger pommel, but did not 
have the same perpendicular drop at the rear of the pommel as the 
patented design.41  The Court initially held that Whitman’s combina-
tion of the Jenifer and Granger saddles was not patentable.42  How-
ever, the Court went on to address the issue of infringement, stating: 
 The shape of the front end being old, the sharp drop of the 
pommel at the rear seems to constitute what was new and to 
be material. . . . If, therefore, this drop were material to the 
design, and rendered it patentable as a complete and integral 
Whole, there was no infringement.43 
Although the Court’s infringement analysis would come to be in-
terpreted by lower courts as setting out a requirement that an accused 
design appropriate the patented design’s point of novelty over the 
prior art, the Court set out no such requirement. 
IV. THE PATH TO POINT OF NOVELTY 
Early cases followed Whitman Saddle by comparing the patented 
design and the accused design taking into consideration the prior art, 
but did not impose the rigid point-of-novelty requirement that would 
come to characterize later cases.  Bevin Bros. Manufacturing Co. v. 
Starr Bros. Bell Co.44 was the first in the line of cases leading up to 
the point-of-novelty requirement.  The design patent covered a bell 
with a body portion in the shape of an “oblate spheroid.”45  In deter-
mining whether the accused design infringed, the court stated that it 
“may avail itself of such common knowledge as is possessed by the 
  
 41. Id. at 682. 
 42. Id. at 681. 
 43. Id. at 682.  The Whitman Saddle decision was issued before there was a 
statutory nonobviousness requirement.  Had the statutory nonobviousness re-
quirement been in place, the Court’s analysis may have been different.  See Perry 
J. Saidman, What Is the Point of the Point of Novelty Test for Design Patent In-
fringement?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 401, 419 (2008) [hereinafter 
What Is the Point]. 
 44. 114 F. 362 (C.C.D. Conn. 1902). 
 45. Id. at 362. 
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general public.”46  It then determined that “[t]he shape of defen-
dants’ bell differs from plaintiff’s more widely than plaintiff’s dif-
fers from the [prior art] door knob, and therefore defendants’ con-
struction does not infringe the patent.”47 
Figure 2.  Bevin Design48 
 
Similarly, in Zidell v. Dexter,49 the Ninth Circuit looked to the 
prior art when the patented design was a combination of prior art 
designs.  The patented design covered children’s clothing and was a 
combination of elements known in the prior art.50  The accused de-
signs brought together the same prior art elements in a different 
combination.51  The court found no infringement, stating that “[t]he 
differences in designs, which under the patent law will avoid in-
fringement, are differences which will attract the attention of the 
ordinary observer, giving such attention as the purchaser usually 
  
 46. Id. at 363. 
 47. Id. 
 48. U.S. Patent No. 33,142 fig.1 (filed July 27, 1900) (arrows removed). 
 49. 262 F. 145 (9th Cir. 1920). 
 50. Id. at 146. 
 51. Id. at 147.  The lower court found that one of the accused designs did in-
fringe.  Id.  The defendant did not appeal this ruling.  Id. 
File: Szarenski Final v.3.doc Created on: 1/24/10 7:12 PM Last Printed: 1/24/10 7:12 PM 
2009 A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE LAW OF DESIGN PATENTS? 97 
gives in buying articles of the kind in question and for the purposes 





Figure 3.  Zidell Design53 
 
  
 52. Id.  In holding that the lower court was not in error by finding the patent 
valid, the court may have broken from the Supreme Court’s holding in Whitman 
Saddle.  See id. at 146. 
 53. U.S. Patent No. D52,720 fig.2 (filed Aug. 12, 1918). 
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Figure 4.  Applied Arts Design54 
 
Later decisions began imposing a requirement that an accused 
design appropriate the patented design’s point of novelty to support a 
finding of infringement, but fell short of an explicit point-of-novelty 
test.  Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp.55 is rep-
resentative of such cases.  The patented and accused designs were 
combination lighter/ashtrays for an automobile dashboard.56  The 
Sixth Circuit recognized precedent stating that “a design patent is not 
infringed by anything which does not present the appearance which 
distinguishes the design claimed in the patent from the prior art.”57  
Such an explicit requirement of an accused design’s appropriation of 
the distinguishing characteristics of the patented design is more re-
strictive than Gorham’s admonition that infringement is present 
when an ordinary observer would be deceived.58  In attempting to 
reconcile the more restrictive rule with Gorham, the court held that 
“[t]he ordinary observer is not any observer, but one who, with less 
than the trained faculties of the expert, is a purchaser of things of 
  
 54. U.S. Patent No. D84,811 figs.1 & 2 (filed Dec. 20, 1930). 
 55. 67 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1933). 
 56. Id. at 428. 
 57. Id. at 429. 
 58. Id. 
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similar design, or one interested in the subject.”59  Thus, “similitude 
of appearance is to be judged by the scope of the patent in relation to 
the prior art.”60  Because the difference between the accused design 
and patented design was greater than the difference between the pat-
ented design and the prior art, the court found no infringement.61 
The first case to set out an explicit point-of-novelty test in addi-
tion to the ordinary-observer test was Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Talge.  Foster L. Talge sued Sears, arguing that Sears had infringed 
his design patents on fruit juicers.62  The Eighth Circuit set out the 
test for design patent infringement: 
The test of whether one design infringes another depends 
primarily upon whether the appearance of the two designs is 
substantially the same.  The application of this test involves 
two considerations: first, to infringe, the identity of appear-
ance, or sameness of effect as a whole upon the eye of an or-
dinary purchaser must be such as to deceive him, inducing 
him to purchase one, supposing it to be the other; and, sec-
ond, to infringe, the accused device must appropriate the 
novelty in the patented device which distinguishes it from the 
prior art.63 
For support of a separate point-of-novelty test, the Eighth Circuit 
cited cases, including Applied Arts and Whitman Saddle, which men-
tioned a comparison of the patented design with the prior art but did 
not articulate a two-part test.64  Despite the articulation of a second 
test for infringement, the Eighth Circuit applied the ordinary-
observer test in the same way as Applied Arts and Whitman Saddle 
and found that there was no confusion under the ordinary-observer 
test.65 
  
 59. Id. at 430 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. Id. at 429. 
 61. Applied Arts, 67 F.2d at 430. 
 62. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Talge, 140 F.2d 395, 395 (8th Cir. 1944). 
 63. Id. at 395–96 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 64. Id. at 396. 
 65. Id. 
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Figure 5.  Talge Designs66 
     
V. LITTON SYSTEMS AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The Federal Circuit first articulated a separate point-of-novelty 
test in Litton Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.  Litton Systems sued 
Whirlpool for infringement of design patent covering the design of 
microwave ovens and microwave oven doors.67  Citing Sears, Roe-
buck, the Federal Circuit announced a point-of-novelty test separate 
from the ordinary-observer test.68  In determining the point of nov-
elty of the design, the court looked to the point of novelty as deter-
  
 66. U.S. Patent No. D105,335 fig.1 (filed June 5, 1937); U.S. Patent No. 
D105,071 fig.1 (filed Apr. 30, 1937). 
 67. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  
Litton also alleged infringement of a utility patent and violation unfair competition 
law.  Id.  The Federal Circuit held that the utility patent was invalid because the 
USPTO calculated the filing date as more than one year from the date of sale.  Id. 
at 1436, 1440.  The Federal Circuit ruled in favor of Whirlpool on the unfair com-
petition claims.  Id. at 1449. 
 68. Id. at 1444. 
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mined by the nonobviousness analysis.69  The Whirlpool design fea-
tured none of these points of novelty; the court therefore held that 
there was no infringement.70  Because there was no infringement 
under the point-of-novelty test, the Federal Circuit did not reach a 
determination on the ordinary-observer test. 
Although the point-of-novelty test worked well when the pat-
ented design involved a single improvement over a single prior art 
reference, it was difficult to apply when the patented design involved 
multiple improvements over several different prior art references.71  
In Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner International, LLC,72 for in-
stance, the Federal Circuit held that the point of novelty of a design 
could not consist of a combination of elements:  
If the combination of old elements shown in the prior art is 
itself sufficient to constitute a “point of novelty” of a new de-
sign, it would be the rare design that would not have a point 
of novelty.  The practical effect of Lawman’s theory would 
be virtually to eliminate the significance of the “points of no-
velty” test in determining infringement of design patents, and 
to provide patent protection for designs that in fact involve 
no significant changes from the prior art.73 
  
 69. Id.  The use of points of novelty as determined by the nonobviousness analy-
sis allows for what is essentially an invalidity determination, only with a lower 
burden placed on the infringer.  This backdoor invalidity attack is one of the main 
criticisms of the point-of-novelty analysis.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae American 
Intellectual Property Law Ass’n in Support of Neither Party at 9–10, Egyptian 
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess III), 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(No. 2006-1562); Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Apple Inc. in Support of Nei-
ther Party (Supporting Reversal) at 18, Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d 665 (No. 
2006-1562).  The problem is illustrated by Litton Systems itself, as the patent was 
held to be nonobvious.  728 F.2d at 1443. 
 70. Litton Sys., 728 F.2d at 1444. 
 71. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Ass’n 
in Support of Neither Party, supra note 69, at 8–9; Corrected Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Apple Inc. in Support of Neither Party (Supporting Reversal), supra note 
69, at 25–26. 
 72. 437 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 73. Id. at 1386 (citing Winner Int’l Corp. v. Wolo Mfg. Corp. 905 F.2d 375, 376 
(Fed. Cir. 1990)).  Two years earlier, the Federal Circuit had upheld a district 
court’s ruling that the point of novelty of a design patent was a combination of 
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Additionally, the Federal Circuit often inconsistently applied the 
point-of-novelty test.  In Arminak & Associates, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain 
Calmar, Inc.,74 Arminak filed an action for a declaratory judgment 
of noninfringement of Calmar’s patent on a “trigger sprayer 
shroud.”75  The Federal Circuit found one of the points of novelty to 
be a prominent horizontal line.76  The court found the accused design 
contained this point of novelty, but it “result[ed] in a different over-
all design appearance.”77  Therefore, the court reasoned, the point of 
novelty was not appropriated.78  This incorporation of the ordinary-
observer test into the point-of-novelty test elevated the burden of 
proof in an infringement action even higher. 
VI. EGYPTIAN GODDESS V. SWISA 
A. District Court 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. (EGI) sued Swisa, Inc. and Dror Swisa, 
an individual, for infringement of a design patent on a nail buffer.79  
The patented design consisted of a hollow rectangular tube with ex-
posed edges and buffers on three sides, the fourth side being bare.80  
The accused design was similar in appearance, except that it had four 
buffers, one on each side.81  At the trial court level, EGI argued that 
its design contained four elements—an open and hollow body, 
  
three elements.  See Avia Group Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 
1565 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  The court’s break with precedent in Lawman was highly 
criticized.  See generally Aaron Cook, Note, Points of Novelty, Lawman Armor, 
and the Destruction of Design Patents!, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 103 (2007); Dan-
iel Adam Nadel, Note, The Elusive Point of Novelty Test Leaves Design Patent 
Infringement in Limbo: A Critique of Lawman Armor Corporation v. Winner In-
ternational, LLC, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 343 (2008). 
 74. 501 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2906 (2008). 
 75. Id. at 1318. 
 76. Id. at 1325. 
 77. Id. at 1326. 
 78. Id.  The court cited no authority for this proposition. 
 79. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess I), No. 3:03-CV-
0594-N, 2005 WL 5873510, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2005). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at *2. 
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square cross-section, raised rectangular pads, and exposed corners—
and that the point of novelty of the design was the combination of 
those four elements.82  At summary judgment, the district court 
found that the Nailco patent83 contained all of the elements except a 
fourth side without a pad; the court also found that the fourth side 
without a pad was the point of novelty of EGI’s design.84  The Swisa 
design did not contain this element, so the point of novelty was not 
appropriated.85  The district court therefore granted Swisa’s motion 
for summary judgment on the issue of infringement.86 
Figure 6.  EGI Design87 
 
  
 82. Id. at *2 & n.4. 
 83. U.S. Patent No. D416,648 (filed Aug. 17, 1998). 
 84. Egyptian Goddess I, 2005 WL 5873510, at *2. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. U.S. Patent No. D467,389 fig.1 (filed Feb. 13, 2002). 
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Figure 7.  Nailco Patent88 
 
B. Panel Hearing 
EGI appealed the district court’s finding of noninfringement to 
the Federal Circuit.89  The majority established a new rule requiring 
a combination to be “a non-trivial advance over the prior art” in or-
der to constitute a point of novelty.90  The new non-trivial advance 
test moved the point-of-novelty test even closer to the nonobvious-
ness test.  The majority shrugged off this consequence stating, 
“[d]esign patent law has already intertwined the infringement and 
validity tests.”91  The majority then concluded that “no reasonable 
juror could conclude that EGI’s asserted point of novelty constituted 
a non-trivial advance over the prior art,” and upheld the lower 
court’s granting of summary judgment to the defendant.92 
  
 88. ’648 Patent. 
 89. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess II), 498 F.3d 1354, 
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 90. Id. at 1357.  In doing so, the majority distinguished Lawman, stating that it 
did not reject non-trivial advance test.  Id. at 1357 n.2. 
 91. Id. at 1358 n.3. 
 92. Id. at 1358–59. 
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Judge Dyk dissented, stating that he would not have created the 
new non-trivial advance standard because it departed from precedent 
and was not addressed by either party.93  Judge Dyk went on to point 
out the flaws of the non-trivial advance test.  First, it “eviscerate[d] 
the statutory presumption of validity” because it placed the burden 
on the patentee to prove nonobviousness in order to show infringe-
ment.94  Second, the test was too narrow because it applied only to 
design patents involving a combination of designs.95  Third, the test 
was too broad because it extended an obviousness test to each indi-
vidual point of novelty, not just the overall design.96  Fourth, “it 
[was] almost impossible to determine whether a particular design 
feature represent[ed] a trivial or substantial advance over the prior 
art.”97  Fifth, the new test was not supported by case law and was 
actually contrary to several Federal Circuit holdings.98  Judge Dyk 
also pointed out that the non-trivial advance test was actually more 
restrictive than the nonobviousness test for validity because the non-
trivial advance test did not take into account secondary considera-
tions.99  The Federal Circuit granted EGI’s petition for en banc re-
hearing, ordering the parties to address whether the point-of-novelty 
test should “be a test for infringement of design patent [sic].”100 
C. En Banc 
At the en banc hearing, EGI argued that the ordinary-observer 
test alone could adequately address the concerns meant to be ad-
dressed by the point-of-novelty and non-trivial advance tests.101  
  
 93. Id. at 1359 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Egyptian Goddess II, 498 F.3d at 1359 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1359–60. 
 99. Id. at 1359 n.1. 
100. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 256 F. App’x 357, 357 (Fed. Cir. 
2007).  The court also directed questions on specifics of the point-of-novelty test 
and what role claim construction should play in interpretation of design patents.  
Id. at 357–58. 
101. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess III), 543 F.3d 665, 
672 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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Swisa, on the other hand, argued that the Supreme Court had 
adopted the point-of-novelty test in Whitman Saddle and the Federal 
Circuit could not depart from it.102  
The Federal Circuit, in a unanimous opinion, first recognized 
that the point-of-novelty test was difficult to apply in cases that did 
not involve a single advance over a single prior art reference.103  The 
court then held that the point-of-novelty test was inconsistent with 
Gorham and not mandated by Whitman Saddle or other precedent 
prior to Litton Systems.104  The court stated that the point of novelty 
test was not mandated by Whitman Saddle because: (1) nothing in 
Whitman Saddle suggested a point of novelty test;105 and (2) cases 
immediately subsequent to Whitman Saddle interpreted it as requir-
ing a comparison between the patented design and the prior art, 
without the requirement of a specific point of novelty.106 
The court also held that the ordinary-observer test, as set out in 
Whitman Saddle, was sufficient to guard against expansive asser-
tions of design patent rights.107  A comparison between the patented 
design, the accused design, and the prior art was sufficient to deter-
mine if an ordinary observer would be deceived.108  Furthermore, the 
ordinary-observer test avoided the problems inherent in the point-of-
novelty test.109 
Specifically, according to the court, the point-of-novelty test in-
correctly focused only on specific aspects of a design, rather than the 
design as a whole.110  Furthermore, the more novel the design, the 
more difficult it was to determine a point of novelty.111  Addition-
ally, the case law was never clear as to what extent combinations of 
  
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 671. 
104. Id. at 672. 
105. Id. at 673. 
106. Id. at 674–75. 
107. Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d at 676. 
108. Id. at 676–77. 
109. Id. at 677; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property 
Law Ass’n in Support of Neither Party, supra note 69; Corrected Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Apple Inc. in Support of Neither Party (Supporting Reversal), supra note 
69. 
110. Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d at 677. 
111. Id. 
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prior art elements constituted a point of novelty.112  Notably, the 
Federal Circuit did not mention that the point-of-novelty test had 
become a backdoor invalidity attack.  For these reasons, the Federal 
Circuit rejected the point-of-novelty test along with the non-trivial 
advance test.113 
In place of the point-of-novelty test, the Federal Circuit an-
nounced that the ordinary-observer test would remain in place with a 
slight modification: the factfinder would also consider the prior 
art.114  Under this modified ordinary-observer test, a court first ex-
amines the patented and accused designs.115  If the two designs “are 
not plainly dissimilar,” the factfinder should compare the two de-
signs in light of the prior art.116  According to the court, this modifi-
cation of the ordinary-observer test more closely followed the analy-
sis of Whitman Saddle and subsequent circuit court decisions.117  
The court placed the burden on the patentee to prove infringement, 
but the burden was placed on the accused infringer to produce prior 
art references that show an ordinary observer would not be con-
fused.118  Despite the Federal Circuit’s elimination of the point-of-
novelty test, the court still ruled against EGI.119  The court held that 
ordinary purchasers of nail buffers distinguished between those buff-
ers with three pads and those with four pads; accordingly, an ordi-
  
112. Id.; see supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
113. Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d at 678. 
114. Id.  This test has been dubbed the “3-way Visual Comparison” test.  See 
What Is the Point, supra note 43, at 412–13.  Both the AIPLA and Apple amicus 
briefs argued eloquently for taking into account the prior art while applying the 
ordinary-observer test.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property 
Law Association in support of Neither Party, supra note 69; Corrected Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Apple Inc. in Support of Neither Party, supra note 69. 
115. Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d at 678. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 678–79.  Additionally, the Federal Circuit held that district courts need 
not verbally construe design patents as a prerequisite to infringement analysis.  Id. 
at 679.  This holding may make proving infringement easier.  See Perry J. Saidman 
& Allison Singh, The Death of Gorham Co. v. White: Killing It Softly with Mark-
man, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 792 (2004). 
119. Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d at 682. 
File: Szarenski Final v.3.doc Created on:  1/24/10 7:12 PM Last Printed: 1/24/10 7:12 PM 
108 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 8, No. 1 
nary observer would not believe the accused design to be the same as 
the patented design.120 
VII. THE EFFECT OF THE ABOLITION OF THE POINT-OF-NOVELTY TEST 
The Federal Circuit’s rejection of the point-of-novelty test has 
been hailed as a victory for design patent holders,121 but how great of 
an impact will it have on design infringement analysis?  It would be 
incorrect to assume that, under Egyptian Goddess, all previous cases 
that found infringement under the ordinary-observer test, but not the 
point-of-novelty test, would come out in favor of the patent holder.  
Courts, in their application of the ordinary-observer test, often did 
not take any account of the prior art.  Although there will undoubt-
edly be benefits for those designs that do not have an easily articu-
lated point of novelty, there will also be designs in a crowded field 
of prior art that are not infringed under either the point-of-novelty 
and the post-Egyptian Goddess ordinary-observer standard.  Only 
when more cases using the new ordinary-observer test are handed 
down will one definitively be able to determine the effect that Egyp-
tian Goddess will have on design patent law.  However, by reexam-
ining those cases that have already been decided under the old stan-
dard, one may be able to formulate an educated guess.  In this spirit, 
this section will first analyze the first cases to apply the new ordi-
nary-observer test.  Then, with those analyses in mind, this Note will 
examine Torspo Hockey International, Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd.122 
  
120. Id.  The Federal Circuit denied EGI’s petition for rehearing without opinion.  
EGI petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, arguing that “the 
Federal Circuit erred by failing to hold that when the patented and accused designs 
are compared in light of the prior art designs, the comparison is to be conducted by 
viewing the visual effect of each design as a whole.”  Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at 6, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess IV), 129 S. Ct. 
1917 (2009) (No. 08-1031).  The Supreme Court denied certiorari.  Egyptian God-
dess IV, 129 S. Ct. at 1917. 
121. See Exposed!, supra note 1, at 860 (“The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit . . . has provided some long-needed relief for design patent owners.”); 
Hanovice, supra note 1, at S3 (“Design patent holders have reason to celebrate . . . 
.”). 
122. 491 F. Supp. 2d 871 (D. Minn. 2007). 
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and Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc. (Fisher-Price II),123 two pre-
Egyptian Goddess infringement cases where the patentee satisfied 
the ordinary-observer test, but not the point-of-novelty test. 
A. Post-Egyptian Goddess 
The first design patent infringement case decided after Egyptian 
Goddess, Arc’teryx Equipment, Inc. v. Westcomb Outerwear, Inc.,124 
may be indicative of how infringement analyses will be conducted in 
the future.  Arc’teryx brought suit against Westcomb for infringe-
ment of the D513,715 Patent125 for a jacket zipper.126  On West-
comb’s summary judgment motion, the court found no infringe-
ment.127  The court first determined that the ordinary observer con-
sisted of “an outdoor clothing customer who is more discerning that 
[sic] an average retail shopper.”128  Taking notice of the Federal Cir-
cuit’s deviation from requiring a verbal description, the district court 
instead focused on the impression that the two zippers would leave 
on the ordinary observer.129  The court stated: “An ordinary observer 
of the ’715 patent would be left with the impression that the zipper 
contains two sections . . . .  An ordinary observer of Defendant’s 
product would be left with the impression that Defendant’s zipper 
consists of three sections . . . .”130  The placement of the diagonal 
sections, the length of the diagonal sections, and the lengths of the 
straight sections were also taken into account.131  Examining the 
prior art, the court found that the patented design was closer to the 
Lowe Alpine’s Black Ice Jacket, which was prior art, than it was to 
the accused design.132  Therefore, there was no infringement.133 
 
  
123. 109 F. App’x 387 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
124. No. 2:07-CV-59 TS, 2008 WL 4838141 (D. Utah Nov. 4, 2008). 
125. U.S. Patent No. D513,715 (filed Aug. 10, 2004). 
126. Arc’teryx Equip., 2008 WL 4838141, at *1. 
127. Id. at *3. 
128. Id. at *2. 
129. Id. at *2–3. 
130. Id. at *2. 
131. Id. at *3. 
132. Arc’teryx Equip., 2008 WL 4838141, at *3. 
133. Id. 
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Figure 8.  Arc'teryx Design134 
 
 
International Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp.,135 also 
applied the new ordinary-observer test.  International Seaway sued 
Walgreens and a supplier for infringement of three patents for the 
design of a clog.136  Walgreens moved for summary judgment, argu-
ing that International Seaway’s patents were anticipated by two 
models of shoes made by Crocs, Inc.137  Applying the ordinary-
observer test, the court found that “[t]he actual shape of the overall 
shoe and the sole is nearly identical between the two shoes.”138  The 
slight variations in the number and location of holes on the sole of 
the shoe were not enough for an ordinary observer to get a different 
  
134. U.S. Patent No. D513,715 fig.1 (filed Aug. 10, 2004). 
135. 599 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
136. Id. at 1310.  The patents owned by Seaway were: U.S. Patent No. D545,033 
(filed Feb. 16, 2006); U.S. Patent No. D545,032 (filed Feb. 1, 2006); U.S. Patent 
No. D529,263 (filed Feb. 18, 2005). 
137. Int’l Seaway Trading, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1312.  Although this case deals 
with anticipation, the analysis is the same as infringement analysis under the max-
im “that which infringes if later, anticipates if earlier.”  See, e.g., SmithKline Bee-
cham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Lewmar Ma-
rine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
138. Int’l Seaway Trading, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. 
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impression.139  Because International Seaway’s patents were not 
novel, the court held that they were invalid.140 
Figure 9.  International Seaway Design141 
 
  
139. Id. at 1318–19. 
140. Id. at 1319.  If the court examined any prior art of the Crocs design, it was 
not mentioned in the opinion.  However, the Crocs patents were sufficiently dis-
tinct from the prior art that the outcome would most likely have been the same.  
See U.S. Patent No. D517,789 (filed May 28, 2004).  A third case has applied the 
post-Egyptian Goddess ordinary-observer standard.  See Minka Lighting, Inc. v. 
Maxim Lighting Int’l, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-995-K, 2009 WL 691594 (N.D. Tex. 
Mar. 16, 2009).  This case is not very instructive, however, as the court determined 
that the accused designs were sufficiently dissimilar to the patented designs that no 
comparison to the prior art was necessary.  See id. at *8. 
141. ’263 Patent fig.1. 
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Figure 10. Crocs Design142 
 
Figure 11.  Prior Art143 
 
  
142. ’789 Patent fig.1. 
143. U.S. Patent No. D479,906 (filed Apr. 4, 2003). 
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B. Pre-Egyptian Goddess 
Torspo Hockey International, Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd., is illustra-
tive of the odd results that sometimes occurred when the point-of-
novelty test was used as a backdoor validity test.  Torspo sought a 
declaratory judgment that Kor’s D514,505 Patent144 was invalid and 
not infringed.145  In response, Kor sought a preliminary injunction 
against Torspo forbidding the selling, making, using, or distributing 
of certain models of Torspo skates.146  To obtain the injunction, Kor 
was required to show, inter alia, that it was reasonably likely to 
prove that Torspo was infringing.147  Applying the ordinary-observer 
test, the court found that an ordinary observer would consider the 
accused design and patented design to be substantially the same.148  
However, the court found that the shape of the skate was “in fact, not 
novel.”149  The court reached this conclusion because Kor carried the 
burden of proving the points of novelty.150  Because Kor was un-
likely to show a point of novelty, the court denied its motion for a 
preliminary injunction.151 
Although Kor was unable to show a reasonable likelihood of 
success on the merits for infringement, the court analyzed whether 
Torspo raised a substantial question as to the patent’s validity.152  
The court found that ’505 Patent was sufficiently distinct from the 
prior art that there was not a substantial question as to invalidity for 
obviousness or anticipation.153 
Although not a final judgment, Torspo is demonstrative of one of 
the major flaws of the point-of-novelty test: its use as a backdoor 
invalidity attack.  Torspo was unable to prove anticipation because 
of the heightened proof requirements.  Kor, however, was left with a 
  
144. U.S. Patent No. D514,505 (filed Sept. 20, 2004). 




148. Id. at 877. 
149. Id. at 877–78. 
150. Id. at 878. 
151. Torspo, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 879. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 881. 
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valid patent that was completely unenforceable.  This result was a 
direct result of two factors.  First, the burden was on Torspo to prove 
anticipation,154 while Kor had the burden to establish points of nov-
elty.155  Second, the court could consider a combination of elements 
when examining novelty, but the point-of-novelty test required the 
elements to be examined individually.156 
Under the new ordinary-observer test, however, the court’s de-
termination of infringement likely would have been different.  The 
prior art cited by Torspo pertained to inline skates as well as ice 
skates.157  These designs contained the arch disclosed in the ’505 
Patent, but none of the designs disclosed “the high heel profile, the 
sloped downward transition from the high profile at the heel toward 
the mid-foot portion, [and] the relatively shallow profile from the 
mid-foot forward to the toe.”158  The ’505 design therefore “departs 
conspicuously from the prior art.”159  The accused design, on the 
other hand, is identical to the patented design.  Comparing the two 
designs, an ordinary observer familiar with skates would not be able 
to distinguish the two.  Under the new ordinary-observer test, the 
Torspo skate would be infringing. 
In Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc., the plaintiff, Fisher-Price, 
brought an infringement suit against various competitors for in-
  
154. Id. at 880–81. 
155. Id. at 879. 
156. Id. at 880 n.6 (citing L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 
1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).  The district court mentioned how this incongruity 
between the novelty and point-of-novelty tests could lead to the bizarre result of a 
design patent being novel, but lacking a point of novelty.  Id.  The same type of 
incongruity may still be present in the modified ordinary-observer test set out in 
Egyptian Goddess.  See Exposed!, supra note 1, at 883–84.  Mr. Saidman, who 
also authored Apple’s amicus brief for the Egyptian Goddess en banc rehearing, 
argues that a hypothetical Swisa design patent application for its nail buffer would 
be denied as obvious.  Id. at 884.  Since the test for obviousness is under the de-
signer skilled in the art standard, and a designer skilled in the art would have a 
more discerning eye than an ordinary observer, the Federal Circuit’s holding that 
the Swisa buffer did not infringe appears to be untenable.  Id. 
157. See U.S. Patent No. 6,267,411 (filed Oct. 6, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 
6,186,519 (filed Sept. 11, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,855,380 (filed Dec. 9, 1996). 
158. Torspo, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 880 (alteration in original). 
159. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess III), 543 F.3d 665, 
677 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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fringement of several patents pertaining to carriers, strollers, and 
bassinets for infants.160  Of the five patents at issue, one, 
D431,940,161 was a design patent for the cover of a bassinet.  The 
only prior art considered by the trial court was a prototype designed 
by Scott Ziegler.162  A jury found the patent valid and infringed, and 
the district court denied the defendant’s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law.163  On appeal, the Federal Circuit overturned the ver-
dict, stating that Fisher-Price failed to establish a point of novelty 
over the prior art.164 
Even under the new ordinary-observer test, this decision would 
likely go against Fisher-Price.  The accused design is actually more 
similar to the Zeigler prior art than it is to the ’940 patent.165  In or-
der to prove infringement, Fisher-Price would have to undermine the 
validity of its ’940 patent by arguing against the novelty of the ’940 
patent over the Zeigler prior art.  As in Applied Arts, the “similitude 
of appearance” between the patented and accused design is not 
enough to create “sameness of effect upon the eye” when viewed in 
relation to the prior art.166 
  
160. Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc. (Fisher-Price I), 279 F. Supp. 2d 530, 
536 (D. Del. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, modified in part, 109 F. App’x 387 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
161. U.S. Patent No. D431,940 (filed May 14, 1999). 
162. Fisher-Price I, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 543. 
163. Id. at 542–47. 
164. Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc. (Fisher-Price II), 109 F. App’x 387, 394 
(Fed. Cir. 2004).  The Federal Circuit stated that Fisher-Price could not point to 
any testimony identifying a point of novelty.  Id.  On the defendants’ motion for 
judgment as a matter of law following the jury verdict, the district court stated 
“Fisher-Price adduced expert testimony suggesting that the points of novelty of the 
’940 patent consisted of the dome and its ornamental features.”  Fisher-Price I, 
279 F. Supp. 2d at 545.  The Federal Circuit did not elaborate on this contradic-
tion.  An examination of the record reveals that the district court erroneously cited 
to a witness’s testimony that did not attempt to compare the patented design with 
the prior art.  See Brief for Appellants Safety 1st, Inc., et al. at 48, Fisher-Price II, 
109 F. App’x 387 (No. 03-1644). 
165. See Brief for Appellants Safety 1st, Inc., et al., supra note 164, at 47. 
166. Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp., 67 F.2d 428, 429–30 
(6th Cir. 1933). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Egyptian Goddess undoubtedly was a victory for design patent 
owners.  The point-of-novelty test, which had no basis in Supreme 
Court precedent, imposed a high standard on holders of design pat-
ents in order to prove infringement.  Additionally, the point-of-
novelty test had the effect of forcing plaintiffs to prove that their 
design patents were enforceable.  But the Federal Circuit’s ruling 
will not affect all design patents equally.  In particular, those patents 
that are sufficiently distinct from the prior art that the determination 
of a point of novelty is difficult, if not impossible, will receive sig-
nificantly more protection after Egyptian Goddess.  Additionally, 
those designs that are exactly copied by an infringer will no longer 
be rendered unenforceable merely because a court determines that 
the design has no point of novelty. 
 
